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Abstract
We use data on interbank loans and a core equilibrium concept to examine the efficiency
of the interbank market in Canada and the bargaining power of its participants. We show
that while the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample.
The exact level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada operating
procedures as well as phases of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, where more intervention implies
more inefficiency. We also find that bargaining power tilted sharply towards borrowers as the the
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explicit involvement of governmental authorities.
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1 Introduction
Multilateral trading markets are endemic in modern economies with well-known examples such
as the bargaining over tariffs and similar trade barriers among the WTO countries, monetary and
fiscal policy-making among the European Union countries, setting copayment rates between hospital
and insurance company networks, and even trades of players among professional sports teams, etc.
Our paper presents a novel approach to empirically assess the efficiency of these markets, and the
bargaining power of the different agents in the market. We use data from the Canadian market for
overnight loans.
A serious impediment to the analysis of efficiency and bargaining power in real-world trading
environments is the complexity of the markets themselves. The players are engaged in a complicated
imperfect competition game in which some of their actions are restricted by trading conventions,
but where the players may communicate and send signals in arbitrary ways. Even if we could
write down a formal model that would capture the interactions among players, it would be difficult
to characterize the equilibrium of such a game—a prerequisite to any analysis of bargaining and
efficiency. Assuming that the obstacle of computing equilibria could be overcome, the outcome
of such a game greatly depends on the assumed extensive-form. For example, outcomes can vary
according to the sequencing of the offers (who is allowed to make an offer to whom and when), as
well as the nature of information asymmetries among the players. For these reasons, a complete
“structural” analysis of such imperfectly competitive bargaining environments seems out of the
question. Finally, we focus in part on the market for loans during the financial crisis of 2008: it is
hard to write down a model for the functioning of this market that would remain valid during this
turmoil.
In this paper we take a different approach. Instead of modeling the explicit multilateral trading
game amongst market participants, we impose an equilibrium assumption on the final outcome of
the market. Our approach is methodologically closer to general equilibrium theory than to game
theory: We use the classical equilibrium concept of the core. The core simply imposes a type of
ex-post no-arbitrage condition on observed outcomes; it requires that the outcome be immune to
defection by any subset of the participating players. Many alternative equilibrium concepts would
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imply outcomes in the core, but the advantage for our purposes is that the core is “model free,” in the
sense that it does not require any assumptions on the extensive-form of the game being played. The
core might seen too weak a theory, but as we shall see, it allows us to draw some sharp conclusions.
We introduce a measure of bargaining power, using the idea of the core. For outcomes which are
in the core, we define a simple measure of how much the observed outcomes favor particular market
participants. We use this measure as an indicator of bargaining power and analyze its relationship
to characteristics of the market and its participants. Thus, in our paper efficiency means the degree
to which the absence of arbitrage conditions imposed by the core are satisfied, and bargaining power
results from the position of the outcomes in the core. If the outcome is relatively more favorable to
some agents, we shall say that these agents have exerted greater bargaining power.
We study the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) in Canada, which is the system the Bank
of Canada uses to implement monetary policy. Throughout the day LVTS participants send each
other payments and at the end of the day must settle their positions to zero. If there are any
remaining short or long positions after negotiating amongst themselves these must be settled with
the Bank of Canada at unfavorable rates. Participants are therefore encouraged to trade with each
other overnight. This market is ideal for various reasons: first, the market operates on a daily
basis among seasoned players, so that inexperience or na¨ıvete of the players should not lead to any
inefficiencies. Second, there is a large amount of detailed data available on the amount and prices of
transactions in this market. Finally, the LVTS is a “corridor” system, meaning that interest rates
in the market are, for the most part, bounded above and below, respectively, by the current rates
for borrowing from and depositing at the Bank of Canada. This makes it easy to specify the outside
options for each market participant, which is a crucial component in defining the core of the game;
at the same time, the corridor leads to a simple and intuitive measure of bargaining power between
the borrowers and lenders in the market. In contrast, in overnight markets without such an explicit
corridor, both the outside options and bargaining power are not as convenient to define.1
Several researchers have explicitly modeled the decision of market participants in environments
similar to LVTS. For example, Ho and Saunders (1985), Afonso and Lagos (2011), Duffie and
1Many central banks use a corridor system – e.g. the ECB. However, the Federal Reserve does not. In response to
the financial crisis, however, the Federal Reserve started paying interest on reserves, and therefore the U.S. interbank
market today looks like a corridor system.
2
Gaˆrleanu (2005), and Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007) examine the efficiency of the allocation
of funds in the Federal funds market or over-the-counter markets, more generally.2 The systems, mar-
kets and agents under study in this paper have previously been examined in Chapman, McAdams,
and Paarsch (2007), Hendry and Kamhi (2009), Bech, Chapman, and Garratt (2010), and Allen,
Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2011).
A market outcome is the result of the overnight loans between the banks at the end of the day:
the outcome consists of the payoffs to the different banks. We (1) check if each outcome is in the
core (this can be done by simply checking a system of inequalities), and (2) measure the degree to
which outcomes are aligned with the interests of net borrowers or lenders in the system. We proceed
to outline our results.
In the pre-crisis period, 2004-2007, the system largely complies with the core: it is efficient and
there are few deviations from the absence of arbitrage. The bargaining power measure generally
hovers around 0.5, meaning that borrowers and lenders are equally favored. When a borrower
represents a riskier prospect than average, the bargaining power favors the lender, meaning that a
lender can command higher interest rates if it lends to a riskier bank (or to a given bank in riskier
circumstances).
With the onset of the crisis in 2008 we see some interesting changes. There is generally an increase
in the number of violations of the core, so that the market becomes less efficient (in absolute terms,
though, the inefficiencies are never very large). The bargaining power shifts to favor the borrowers;
indeed, increased levels of risk are associated with changes in bargaining power to favor borrowers.
That is, during the crisis period, when a net borrowing bank sees an increase in standard measures
of counterparty risk (including the Merton (1974) “distance to default” measure, credit default swap
(CDS) prices, and exposure to wholesale funding), it receives better terms in the interbank loans
market. All these results contrast sharply with our findings for the “normal” period, 2004-2007.
The needs for funds during the crisis should, as one might expect, have favored the lenders.
Instead, we see borrowers obtaining better terms, and (surprisingly) a positive correlation between
borrowers’ bargaining power and measures suggesting increasing default risk in the market.3
2An interested reader can find a book length treatment of the economics of OTC markets in Duffie (2012).
3 Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2010) construct a model in which “strong” banks exercise market power over
“weak” banks which do not have other non-central bank outside options. Our findings seem to go counter to their
results. Qualitatively, at least, our results are in line with Goodfriend and King (1988)
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During the financial crisis the Bank of Canada increased its injections of cash to the LVTS. We
do not find a relation between the injections and bargaining power, but they are positively correlated
with violations of the core. The additional cash seems to have cause some situations where arbitrage
opportunities were left unexploited. In turn, we find that more core violations are associated with
higher bargaining power for the borrowers.
We believe that our findings may reflect an attempt by the system to shore up troubled banks:
A “too big to fail” theory. In the words of then Bank of Canada Governor David Dodge, “We have
a collective interest in the whole thing not going into a shambles.” Our evidence is consistent with
lenders being more lenient with borrowers, and in particular with the borrowers who were subject to
higher levels of risk (be it at the level of the individual bank, or the system). It is also possible that
the additional core violations during the crisis reflect banks being less concerned with exploiting
arbitrage opportunities and more with keeping the system whole.
There is a particular reason why Canadian banks might be more concerned about the failure of
other banks. The entry into the Canadian system is regulated. The result is an oligopolistic market
where banks can exploit monopoly rent. The failure of one bank might have opened the door for
the entry of new players into the market, something that the existing banks would not be favorable
to. It is therefore plausible that the banks who were relatively better off could have offered better
terms to the most troubled banks during the crisis. This interpretation is in the long tradition of
the theory of regulation presented in Becker (1983) and Becker (1985).
Another reason is that mark-to-market accounting and bank interconnectedness means that some
banks were concerned with their positions vis-a´-vis the riskier banks (e.g. Bond and Leitner (2010)).
The short-term cost of lending to a risky interconnected bank at a discount might be far less than
the cost of having to mark down assets linked to a failed institution.
Overall, our findings are consistent with a “weak” version of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) hypoth-
esis, whereby banks within the Canadian overnight market continued to lend to risky counterparties
despite the increasing risk in the market. However, such actions were not directly supported or
guaranteed by regulators, as would be the case under the government-sponsored TBTF hypothesis;
indeed, unlike in the U.S., no bail-outs or other forms of support were ever mentioned or undertaken
in the Canadian financial sector. Rather, the observed effects appear to be a spontaneous reaction
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among the players in the market.
Of course, the TBTF hypothesis has been widely discussed and circulated in both the academic
(O’Hara and Shaw (1990), Rochet and Tirole (1996), Flannery (2010)) and nonacademic financial
press (Sorkin (2009), Krugman (2010)). As far as we are aware, this paper presents some of the first
quantitative evidence of such a hypothesis.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3
discusses the methodology, both conceptually and how we implement it using the Canadian overnight
interbank lending market. Section 4 presents the results and section 6 concludes.
2 The Canadian Large Value Transfer System (LVTS)
The primary data for our analysis comes from daily bank transactions observed in Canada’s Large
Value Transfer System (LVTS). LVTS is Canada’s payment and settlement system and it is operated
by the Canadian Payment Association. Similar to CHAPS in the U.K. LVTS is a tiered system,
unlike Fedwire in the U.S. That is, there are a small number of direct participants and a larger
number of indirect participants.4 There are currently 15 direct participants in LVTS. These are
the Big 6 Canadian banks (Banque Nationale, Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank), HSBC, ING Canada,
Laurentian Bank, State Street Bank, Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Alberta Treasury Branches,
Caisse Desjardins, and a credit union consortium (Central 1 Credit Union). State Street joined
LVTS in October 2004 and ING joined in October 2010.
Throughout the day payments are sent back-and-forth between direct participants. Like real-time
gross settlement systems (RTGS), finality of payment sent through LVTS is in real-time; however,
settlement in LVTS occurs at the end of the day. Relative to a RTGS system, an LVTS system has
higher costs given default, but also substantial cost savings since banks do not need to post as much
collateral. This is because most transactions in Canada are sent via a survivors pay, or partially
collateralized, tranche. The cost of a partially collateralized system is an increase in counterparty
risk. Participants manage counterparty risk by setting bilateral credit limits at the beginning of
4Indirect participants are outside LVTS and are the clients of the direct participants.
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each day and also manage these limits throughout the day. Allen, Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2011) find,
however, that even during the financial crisis direct participants did not lower their credit limits.
They take this as evidence that there was no increase in counterparty risk in the payments system
during the crisis.
2.1 Data Description
We are interested in studying the price and quantity of interbank overnight loans. Our period of
analysis is April 1, 2004 to April 17, 2009. Unfortunately, as flows in LVTS are not classified as
either a payment or a loan, we have to pick out those transactions which we think are loans from the
potentially thousands of transactions. For this we use the Furfine algorithm (Furfine (1999)). This
approach has been recently used by Acharya and Merrouche (2009), Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar
(2011), and Allen, Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2011) to study liquidity hoarding and counterparty risk
during the financial crisis. The idea is to focus on transactions sent, for example, from bank A to
B towards the end of the day (for robustness we study two different windows: 4-6:30pm, and 5-
6:30pm; but we only report results for the latter) and returned from B to A the following day before
noon for the same amount plus a mark-up equal to a rate near the Bank of Canada’s target rate.
We are relatively loose with the definition of ‘near’, allowing financial institutions to charge rates
plus or minus 50 basis points from target. This approach allows us to identify both the quantity
borrowed/lent and at what price.5
Figure 1 plots both the total loan amounts and average loan size for transactions in LVTS after
5pm between April 2004 and April 2009. On the average day approximately 1.63 billion is transacted,
about 184 million per financial institution. By construction the smallest loan is 50 million; the largest
loan is 1.7 billion. Aside from the large spike in transactions in January 2007, the key noticeable
pattern is the increase in loan amounts in the summer and fall of 2007. The sum of daily transactions
in this period were consistently above $3 billion. This coincides with the Asset-Backed Commercial
5The main issue with the Furfine algorithm is that it has the potential to identify some transactions as loans when
they are indeed payments. This is particularly true when using the algorithm early in the day, or for small transactions.
The situation with LVTS is less problematic than with Fedwire, which processes Euro-dollar transactions, tri-party
repo legs and bank to non-fedwire institution transactions, which may or may not be considered loans. Therefore
using the Furfine algorithm on LVTS transactions is less likely to lead to misclassification error. In addition, we only
examine larger transactions late in the day, making misclassification even less likely.
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Figure 1: Loan Quantities in LVTS
Paper (ABCP) crisis in Canada.6 At the time the market for non-bank issued ABCP froze and
banks had to take back bank-issued ABCP on their balance sheet. By July 2007, the ABCP market
was one-third of the total money market and when maturities came due and were not renewed this
created substantial stress on other sources of liquidity demand. Irrespective of the freezing of the
ABCP market, however, direct participants in LVTS continued lending to each other. The question
is at what price did this lending occur.
Figure 2 plots the average spread to the target rate and its standard deviation for transactions
sent after 5pm between April 2004 and April 21, 2009. Prior to the summer of 2007, i.e. normal
times, the average spread to target is approximately 1 basis point. During the summer of 2007,
however, financial institutions did increase the price of an overnight uncollateralized loan. Between
August 9th, 2007 and October 11th, 2007 the average spread to target was about 4.7 basis points.7
Somewhat surprisingly the spread to target post-October 2007 is 0, and -0.6 basis points in the six
weeks following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. (Allen, Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2011) find that LVTS
6ABCP is a package of debt obligations typically enhanced with a liquidity provision from a bank. In Canada the
bank providing the liquidity only has to pay out under catastrophic circumstances and was not even triggered during
the financial crisis. In addition, the regulator did not require banks to hold capital against the provision. Under these
rules the market approximately doubled between 2000 and 2007 to $120 billion.
7The start of the ABCP crisis is recognized to be August 9th. The Bank of Canada held its first liquidity auction
on October 12th, 2007.
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Figure 2: Loan Prices in LVTS
participants demand for term liquidity was substantial only in this period.)
2.2 Monetary policy and Liquidity policy
Monetary policy has been implemented in Canada since 1999 through LVTS (Reid (2007)). At the
end of the day any short or long positions in LVTS must be settled, either with the Bank of Canada
at a penalty rate, or through interbank trades. The interest rate corridor (the difference between
the rate on overnight deposits and overnight loans) is set so that banks have the right incentives to
find counterparties among themselves to settle their positions. The midpoint of the corridor is the
interest rate that the Bank of Canada targets in its execution of monetary policy.
The symmetry of the interest rate corridor is meant to encourage trading at the target rate.Within
a corridor system a central bank can increase the supply of liquidity without excessively lowering
the target rate since it is bounded below by the deposit rate. Therefore a central bank operating
a corridor can provide liquidity to LVTS participants (liquidity policy) without lowering nominal
rates “too much” (monetary policy).
When the Bank of Canada first implemented LVTS, it targeted zero excess liquidity in the
system. That is, participants had to flatten out their long and short positions completely and
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leave cash settlement balances at zero. However, subsequently the Bank of Canada intervened by
supplying liquidity to the market.
With implementation there was substantial volatility in the overnight rate, therefore in 1999
the Bank started allowing positive “settlement balances” – what this meant was that at the end
of the trading day, market participants were allowed to have short positions, up to a pre-specified
upper limit. Effectively, then, these settlement balances were a means for the Bank of Canada to
inject liquidity into this market. In November 1999, this limit was around $200 million, which was
divided among the 15 LVTS participants at that time. In 2001 the Bank of Canada lowered the
amount of settlement balances to $50 million, and the system remained stable until the end of 2005.
Starting in March 2006, faced with strong downward pressure on the overnight rate, the Bank of
Canada implemented a low liquidity policy by reducing the required balance back to zero, thereby
not allowing participants to have a short position at the end of the day. This regime continued until
the summer of 2007 when, on the eve of the financial crisis, the Bank of Canada joined other central
banks in injecting liquidity into the banking system. Settlement balances were increased to $500
million. Figure 3 presents the settlement balances in LVTS at the end of each day between April
2004 and April 2009, which is our sample period.
Since we expect these shifts in liquidity policy would natually affect efficiency in the LVTS, our
subsequent empirical analysis focuses on how efficiency and bargaining power changed across the
three periods just discussed: First, April 1, 2004 to February 28, 2006, a period of stability in the
Canadian interbank market. Second, March 1, 2006 to February 14, 2007, a period of no liquidity
injections by the central bank. Third, the financial crisis: August 9, 2007 to April 20, 2009.
3 Methodology
We present a cooperative bargaining model of the market for overnight loans, and use it to study
efficiency and bargaining power. We prefer this cooperative approach to a noncooperative (game-
theoretic) model of bargaining which, as is well-known, very sensitive to the specific extensive-form
which is assumed: it depends on the order in which offers are made, on the assumptions of player
communication, and the information that they posses. Given that we study the volatile period
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Figure 3: Settlement Balances in LVTS
surrounding the financial crisis of 2008, the assumption that a stable extensive form bargaining
model is valid throughout this period would be quite strained. The crisis period is very unlikely to
fit any version of known extensive-form bargaining models.
Instead of a game-theoretic model of bargaining, we apply the concept of the core to an interbank
loan market. Essentially, the core is a basic “no-arbitrage” requirement; it may at first not seem
restrictive enough, but we show that it can used to investigate the bargaining power of the financial
institutions in the system. We can estimate a simple measure of the bargaining power of the
institutions who had a need for funds, versus those that held a positive position in the market for
interbank loans.
The cooperative approach assumes that agents can make binding commitments. In contrast, a
non-cooperative model would need to construct explicit commitments through repeated-game effects.
Repeated games are empirically complicated because they tend to predict too little. Our approach
gives a set-valued prediction (the core of the market), so we shall not predict a unique allocation
of trades; but, as we shall see, the prediction is still quite sharp and useful. At the same time, for
allocations which are within the core, we can naturally construct a measure of bargaining power, by
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looking at whether the observed allocation favors lenders or borrowers in the market more.
The market has n agents, each with a net position (at the end of the day) of ωi ∈ R. The Bank
of Canada sets a target rate r. It offers each bank (collateralized) credit at the bank rate b = r+ 25,
and pays the deposit rate d = r− 25 > 0 on positive balances. These rates are fixed “take it or leave
it” offers, and hence we use these as the benchmark from which to calculate bargaining power. In a
sense, the Bank of Canada has the maximum bargaining power in this market, and we use its rates
to calibrate the bargaining power of other agents.
We assume that
∑
i ωi = 0, so that positive and negative balances in the aggregate cancel out.
It is easy to accommodate
∑
i ωi of any magnitude in the analysis below, but since we calculate
balances from transactions data,
∑
i ωi = 0 is always satisfied automatically in our data.
In this setup, agents have incentives to trade with each other at rates somewhere in the band.
Define a characteristic function game by setting the stand alone value for a coalition S ⊆ N =
{1, ..., n} as:
ν(S) =
 b
∑
i∈S ωi if
∑
i∈S ωi ≤ 0
d
∑
i∈S ωi if
∑
i∈S ωi > 0
. (1)
These inequalities present the idea that the best a coalition S can do is to use multilateral negotia-
tions to pool their net positions, and then deposit (or borrow) the pooled sum
∑
i∈S ωi at the Bank
at the rate d (or b).
The payoff to a bank is simply a number, xi, which is the net position of that bank, ωi, multiplied
by the bank’s negotiated rates (yi). The core of ν is the set of rates (y1, ..., yn) such that: (i)∑
i∈N yiωi = 0 (this is just an accounting identity that among all the banks net payments and
outlays must cancel out); and, (ii) for all coalitions S,
∑
i∈S yiωi ≥ ν(S). That is, any coalition
must obtain a payoff exceeding its standalone value.
Intuitively, the core of this game is the set of rates which are “immune” to multilateral nego-
tiations on the part of any coalition S (which would result in the coalition payoff ν(S) defined in
equation 1). Clearly in LVTS full multilateral bargaining among all subsets of the participants may
not be feasible, due perhaps to time constraints, informational issues, etc. The empirical question
is how many observed outcomes are outside the core and whether there is any pattern to these
violations.
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Necessary Conditions: We first derive necessary conditions for a set of interest rates {y1, ..., y}
to be in the core.
1. Individual rationality requires that yiωi ≥ ν({i}). That is: yi ≥ d if ωi > 0 and yi ≤ b if
ωi < 0.
2. Similarly,
∑
j∈N\{i} yjωj ≥ ν(N\{i}) implies the following: if ωi > 0 then
∑
j∈N\{i} ωj =∑
j∈N ωj − ωi = 0− ωi < 0. Therefore ν(N\{i}) = −bωi. Hence,
0− yiωi =
∑
j∈N\{i}
yjωj ≥ ν(N\{i}) = −bωi,
which implies that yi ≤ b. Therefore
b ≥ yi ≥ d. (2)
A similar argument implies that b ≥ yi ≥ d when ωi < 0.
Now it is easy to check that the vectors of rates (d, ..., d) and (b, ..., b) are both in the core.8
The first is the best allocation for the debtors and the second is the best allocation for the
creditors. All the allocations λ(b, . . . , b) + (1 − λ)(d, . . . , d) for λ ∈ (0, 1) are in the core as
well. In fact, when the allocation lies on this line, or close to it, the we can interpret λ as
a measure of bargaining power for the creditors. When λ ∼ 1 we obtain the core allocations
that are best for the creditors; note that in this case the creditors are obtaining a deal which
is similar to the “take it or leave it” offer of the Bank of Canada. It makes sense to interpret
such an allocation as reflective of a high bargaining power on the side of creditors. Similarly,
when λ ∼ 0 we obtain the core allocations that are best for the borrowers. In this case, they
are getting a similar deal to the one obtained by the Bank of Canada in its role as borrower.
Below, we will show that, for the trades observed in the LVTS, this λ measure is an adequate
measure of bargaining power.
8 Thus, the core is always non-empty. A necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core is
that the game be balanced. A basic exposition of the theory is in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
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3. For a general coalition S, we require that
∑
i∈S
yiωi ≥ d
∑
i∈S
ωi, for
∑
i∈S
ωi > 0
∑
i∈S
yiωi ≥ b
∑
i∈S
ωi, for
∑
i∈S
ωi < 0.
(3)
In the second inequality above, because b > 0 (as is typically the case), the right-hand side of
the inequality is negative. These two inequalities embody the intuition that a coalition which
is collectively a net lender (resp. borrower) must obtain a higher payoff than lending to (resp.
borrowing from) the Bank of Canada.
4. Finally, when
∑
i∈S ωi = 0 we need to impose that
∑
i∈S yiωi ≥ 0. This just means that a
coalition in which the members’ balances cancel out should not be making a negative payoff.
Next, we provide several examples of the core of markets. In the first, the core is simply the
line segment λ(b, . . . , b) + (1 − λ)(d, . . . d, ); in the second example the core is “wider.” The third
example is an actual trading day in the LVTS.
Example 1 : Suppose that |ωi| = 1 for all i. Then if ωi = 1 and ωj = −1 we require yi − yj ≥ 0,
as ν({i, j}) = 0. Similarly, reasoning from N\{i, j} we get yi− yj ≤ 0, so yi− yj = 0. Then the core
is exactly the allocations λ ∗ (b, . . . , b) + (1− λ) ∗ (d, . . . d, ) for λ ∈ (0, 1).
Example 2 : Suppose that there are three agents, and that the agents’ net positions are (ω1, ω2, ω3) =
(−1,−1, 2). The core is the set of points (y1, y2, y3) that satisfy the core constraints. First, no indi-
vidual agent must be able to block a core allocation, hence all the points in the core are in [d, r]3.
Second, we obtain that 2y3 − y1 ≥ d and 2y3 − y2 ≥ d for coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3}, respectively.
Finally, the coalition of the whole requires that −y1 − y2 + 2y3 = 0. The latter condition, together
with (y1, y2, y3) ∈ [d, r]3, imply the conditions for coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3}. Thus the inequalities
2y3 − y1 ≥ d and 2y3 − y2 ≥ d are redundant.
We illustrate the core in Figure 4. Allocations are points in <3, as there are three agents in the
example. The shaded region is the set of points that satisfy the core constraints. Geometrically, it
consists of the points on the plane −y1 − y2 + 2y3 = 0 that have all their coordinates larger than d
13
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(a) The core in Example 2: y = (d, d, d) and
y = (b, b, b).
y
y
y
(b) An allocation y projected onto the y—y
line.
Figure 4: An illustration of Example 2.
and smaller than b. The half-line λ(b, b, b) + (1 − λ)(d, d, d) is indicated in red in the figure and is
a proper subset of the core. There are then core allocations, such as (b, d, (b+ d)/2), which are not
symmetric.
Figure 4(b) also illustrates how we calculate bargaining power. A point y is projected onto the
line λ(b, b, b) + (1 − λ)(d, d, d). The value of λ corresponding to the projection is a measure of the
bargaining power of the creditors in the bargaining process that resulted in the allocation y.
Example 3: Finally, we consider one illustrative example of an actual allocation from the LVTS.
On this particular day, there were four banks (labeled A,B,E,K) involved, and a total of three trades:
Because we have normalized the target rate to zero, the values of (b, d) are (0.25,−0.25).
Based on these trades, we can construct the bank-specific balances and prices (ωi, yi). For
concreteness, consider bank E, which is both a lender (to B) and a borrower (from K). The value
of ω for E is just its net position, which is −0.29 = 1 − 1.29. Correspondingly, its price y is the
trade-weighted interest rate:
ωE =
(1.0) ∗ (−0.0077) + (−1.29) ∗ (−0.0581)
1− 1.29 = −0.2319.
Similarly, Table 2 contains the positions and prices for all four banks.
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Table 1: Sample trades
Borrower Lender Amount Interest Rate(rel. to target rate)
B E 1.00 -0.0077
E K 1.29 -0.0581
K A 1.00 0.0022
Table 2: Banks positions and prices
Bank ω y
A 1.00 0.0022
B -1.00 -0.0077
E -0.29 -0.2319
K 0.29 -0.2660
For these four banks, there are 24 − 1 = 15 coalitions to check. The different possible coalitions
are listed in Table 3 along with whether they satisfy the core inequalities defined in section 3 above.
First, note that, by construction,
∑
i=A,B,E,K ωi = 0 and
∑
i=A,B,E,K yiωi = 0. Second, we can
see by examining the trades in Table 1 for the reasons that the three coalitions fail to satisfy the
inequalities. In the data, bank K is a net lender of 0.29, at a price of -0.2660, which is lower than
the rate of d = −0.25 it could have obtained by depositing the net amount of 0.29 at the Bank
of Canada. Also, the coalition of {E,K} has a net zero balance, but a payoff of ∑i=E,K ωiyi =
0.29 ∗ (0.2319 − 0.2660) < 0, which is negative. They could have done better if K lent the amount
of 0.29 to E at any rate, in which case their payoff would have been zero.
On the other hand, consider the coalition {A,B,E}, with a net position of∑i=A,B,E ωi = −0.29.
The payoff for this coalition at the observed allocation is
∑
i=A,B,E ωiyi = 0.0771 which exceeds
b∗ (−0.29) = −0.0725. That is, on net, this coalition, despite having a negative net balance, obtains
a positive net payoff, which is of course preferable to borrowing 0.29 from the Bank of Canada at
the rate b = 0.25. This also implies that the banks who are borrowing from the coalition {A,B,E}
– here it is just bank K – must be paying too much for borrowing; this is indeed the case, as the
singleton coalition {K} violates the inequalities.
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Table 3: Inequalities
Coalition Satisfies inequalities?
{A,B,E,K} Yes
{B,E,K} Yes
{A} Yes
{A,E,K} Yes
{B} Yes
{A,B,E} Yes
{K} No
{A,B,K} Yes
{E} Yes
{B,E} Yes
{A,K} Yes
{E,K} No
{A,B} Yes
{A,E} Yes
{B,K} Yes
3.1 In operation
Assuming that the Furfine algorithm correctly gives us the quantities and prices traded every day,
we have (ωit, yit) for banks i = 1, ..., n and days t = 1, ..., T . This corresponds to the outstanding
balance at bank i at the end of day t and the interest rate that bank i either paid (if ωit < 0) or
earned (if ωit > 0) by borrowing or lending in LVTS. Necessary conditions for the day t settlement
interest rates {yit}ni=1 to be in the core of the game are the inequalities (2) and (3) sketched above.
3.1.1 Are Trades in the Core?
Figure 5 plots the degree to which each day’s allocation do not satisfy the core requirement as well
as a one week moving average. It is a plot of the percent coalitions on each day that are violating
our equilibrium concept. On most days the vast majority of overnight loans do not violate our core
equilibrium restrictions and are therefore deemed efficient. However, on approximately 54 per cent
of days there is at least one core restriction that is violated: at least one coalition could do better by
trading among themselves. There are only 9.4 per cent of days where more than 10 per cent of trades
violate the core inequality restrictions. The percent of inefficient coalitions, however, increases in
the fall of 2007 and throughout most of 2008.
We have looked at whether a coalition could improve by trading on its own, and reported the
16
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
F
ra
ct
io
n
 o
f 
n
o
n
-c
o
re
 v
io
la
tin
g
 c
o
a
lit
io
n
s
0
1
ja
n2
00
4
0
1
ju
l2
00
4
0
1
ja
n2
00
5
0
1
ju
l2
00
5
0
1
ja
n2
00
6
0
1
ju
l2
00
6
0
1
ja
n2
00
7
0
1
ju
l2
00
7
0
1
ja
n2
00
8
0
1
ju
l2
00
8
0
1
ja
n2
00
9
0
1
ju
l2
00
9
violation 1-week moving average
Figure 5: Percentage of Coalitions that are Efficient
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Figure 6: Costs of Overnight Loan Outside the Core
percentage of such coalitions (section 3.1.1). One may want to know by how much they could gain:
if the gain is small it might not be worthwhile for lenders and borrowers to negotiate a better
allocation. We can think of the gain as the distance of the allocation to the core, or as the cost of
the bargaining outcome relative to full efficiency.
Next, we assess how large these inefficiencies are. We consider two approaches. The simplest
approach is to measure the distance from the weighted average interest rate from a violating coalition
and the deposit (or Bank) rate and multiply it by loan amount. We calculate this difference as
follows. We take the relevant inequality in equations (3) and divide through by
∑
i∈S ωi. This gives
a quantity weighted average interest rate:
r∗ =
∑
i∈S yiωi∑
i∈S ωi
. (4)
Multiplying the difference between r∗ and the relevant edge of the corridor (d or b) by the loan
amount gives an annual interest cost. Since we are interested in overnight loans we divide this
18
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
G
en
er
al
 e
qu
ili
br
iu
m
 c
os
ts
01
jan
20
04
01
jul
20
04
01
jan
20
05
01
jul
20
05
01
jan
20
06
01
jul
20
06
01
jan
20
07
01
jul
20
07
01
jan
20
08
01
jul
20
08
01
jan
20
09
01
jul
20
09
Figure 7: Costs of Overnight Loan Outside the Core – Optimal Solution
amount by 360 to give a daily cost. The overnight costs are presented in Figure 6.9 The average
cost of a violating allocation is $375, while the largest cost was $4859. Given that the average
bargaining power is approximately 0.5 and there are 8 participants on average where there is a
violation, this cost is split evenly across participants, where each participant on average loses $47
for trading outside the core. This measure, however, does not provide us with the right distribution
of who bears the costs of violating the core constraints because not everyone is trading outside the
core on each day.
A more comprehensive approach to calculating cost is to measure the distance between the
allocation x at any give date and the closest core allocation. To determine this distance we need
to solve the problem of minimizing ||x− z| |, where z satisfies all the core constraints described in
section 3.
The overnight costs are presented in Figure 7. The average cost of correcting a violating allocation
is $636 and the maximum is $2495. These costs are slightly higher than the ones calculated before as
9Formally we can calculate the overnight cost of being outside the core as follows:
cost = sign(x)sign(i)
|x|(|i| − 25)
360
,
where x is the loan amount of a violating coalition and i is the interest rate of a violating coalition.
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“money-on-the-table” since only the violating coalition members pay though the reallocation, rather
than all players. These costs are larger than found in Chapman, McAdams, and Paarsch (2007)
who study the bidding behavior of these same participants in daily 4:30pm auctions for overnight
cash. The authors find that while there are persistent violations of best-response functions in these
auctions, the average cost of these violations is very small, only a couple of dollars.
3.1.2 Bargaining Power
We construct a measure of bargaining power for lenders relative to borrowers for each day, and
then evaluate how it evolves over time. Specifically, we project each daily allocation onto the line
λ(b, . . . , b) + (1− λ)(d, . . . d, ). This gives us an estimate of λ for each day.
As Figure 8 illustrates, λ is an adequate measure of bargaining power for the LVTS trades. In
that figure, we plot (on the y-axis) the actual interest rates received by the LVTS participants,
versus (on the x-axis) the linear projection of this rate on the line segment betwen (b, b, . . . , b) and
(d, d, . . . , d). That is, for the interest rate yit received by bank i on date t, the projected rate is
yˆit = λˆt ∗ b+ (1− λˆt) ∗ d where λˆt denotes the bargaining power measure estimated for day t. (Note
20
that the projected rate yˆit is the same for all banks i trading on day t, because λt does not vary
across banks.) Figure 8 shows that, for the vast majority of trades, the projected rate is quite close
to the actual rate. This provides reassurance that λt serves as an adequate measure of bargaining
power for this market.
Figure 9 plots the bargaining power of the lenders. When λ equals 1 the lender has all the
bargaining power and when it is 0 the borrower has all the bargaining power. The bargaining power
of lenders and borrowers is roughly equal between April 2004 and January 2006. Then it moves in
favor of lenders until January 2008. Lenders bargaining power is the greatest in August to October
of 2007 following the closure of two funds on August 9, 2007 by BNP Parisbas and the ECB and
other central banks, including the Bank of Canada, stating they would inject overnight liquidity.10
Starting in January 2008 the bargaining power of borrowers is greater than that of the lenders. We
analyze the determinants of bargaining power in section 4.
4 Results
Given the prices and quantities from LVTS our approach allows us to solve for the percentage of
transactions that are violations of core (denoted by av), as well as the bargaining power (λ) of
lenders relative to borrowers on every given day. This section explores how av and (1− λ), i.e., the
borrowers bargaining power, are correlated with bank and LVTS characteristics. We also analyze
how costs are related to violations and bargaining power.
4.1 Explanatory Variables
Table 4 presents summary statistics of our variables of interest and explanatory variables. Our
analysis includes bank risk measures such as credit default swap (CDS) spreads, Merton (1974)
distance-to-default (DD), balance sheet measures of risk such as liquidity over assets (L/A), and
10On August 9th, 2007 the Bank of Canada issued a statement that they were ready to provide liquidity. The ECB
injected e95 billion overnight.
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Figure 9: Bargaining Power
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wholesale funding over assets (WF/A).11 We also include an indicator variable for whether or not a
financial institution accessed the Bank of Canada’s term liquidity facility during the crisis (see Allen,
Hortac¸su, and Kastl (2011)), and the Canadian government’s Insured Mortgage Purchase Program
(IMPP).12
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
λ (bargaining power of lender) 0.522 0.054 9,519
av (percent of core violations) 4.7 8.5 9,519
av2 (percent of core violations given av 6= 0) 7.6 9.7 5.907
Loan amount (in millions) 190.83 159.64 9,519
Loan over collateral 0.012 0.016 9.519
Hour sent 5:28pm 45minutes 9,519
Spread to target 0.0108 0.0553 9,519
Settlements 87.60 226.9 9,519
Number of borrowers 5.78 1.73 9,519
Number of lenders 4.29 1.50 9,519
Number of trades 8.97 3.14 9,519
Average coalitions per day 4,958 13,056 9,519
Costs (Money-on-the-table) 374.49 524.03 1,022
Costs (Optimal solution) 636.36 338.29 1,022
CDOR1 −OIS1 0.163 0.142 9,519
Distance to default 5.92 2.27 8,878
Liquid assets/total assets 0.186 0.138 9,516
wholesale funding/total assets 0.126 0.063 9,470
CDS 43.19 45.53 5,346
Notes: These are summary statistics for loans of 50 million dollar and above at or after
4:30pm.
Market trend or risk variables include the spread between the one month Canadian Dealer Of-
fered Rate and one month Overnight Indexed Swap rate (CDOR −OIS), total number of lenders,
borrowers and trades in LVTS on each day, and actual settlement balances in LVTS. The one month
CDOR is equivalent to one month LIBOR in that it is indicative of what rate surveyed banks are
willing to lend to other banks for one month. OIS is an overnight rate and is based on expectations
of the Bank of Canada’s overnight target rate. The spread is a default risk premium. We interpret
increases in the CDOR−OIS spread as increases in default risk of the banking industry generally
11Wholesale funding is defined as fixed term and demand deposits by deposit-taking institutions plus banker ac-
ceptances plus repos
12The IMPP is a government of Canada mortgage buy-back program aimed at adding liquidity to banks’ balance
sheets. On October 16, 2008 the government announced it would buy up to $25 billion of insured mortgages from
Canadian banks. This represented about 8.5% of the banking sectors on-balance sheet insured mortgages. On
November 12, 2008 this was raised to $75 billion, and subsequently raised to $125 billion on January 28, 2009.
23
and not related to any specific institution as DD, CDS, L/A, or WF/A measurements are.
As discussed in section 2.2, settlement balances are important since they are actively managed
by the Bank of Canada. To manage minor frictions and offset transactions costs the Bank typically
allows excess balances of $25 million. Figure 3 shows this to be the case. The figure also shows that
balances can be negative (that is the Bank of Canada left the system short), which they were 15
times between March 2006 and February 2007. Figure 3 also shows that the Bank kept settlement
balances substantially above $25 million for almost the entire time between the summer of 2007 and
early 2009.
Another potentially important factor determining the fraction of efficient coalitions and bargain-
ing power is pledgable collateral. Each day LVTS participants pledge collateral to the system in
case of default. At the end of the day participants who have long or net zero positions withdraw
their collateral, possibly using it in the overnight repo market. Participants that are short must
borrow from the Bank of Canada at unfavorable rates and pledge collateral. Depending on the
amount of collateral and the size of their short position a participant might be short collateral. If
this is the case, a participant negotiating for an overnight loan is in a relatively weak bargaining
position with the long participant. The long participant knows that the short participant does not
have sufficient collateral to borrow from the Bank of Canada and can therefore charge a premium
for lending unsecured.
4.2 Regression Results
4.2.1 Core Violating Regressions
We are interested in explaining a couple of phenomena. (i) What drives violations of the core? How
big are these violations? (ii) What are the main determinants of bargaining power? We consider
Poisson regressions for the percent of violations in a day and probit regressions for whether or not
there was a violation on a given day. We present results for three sub–samples, where an observation
is a day in one of the following periods: (i) April 1, 2004 to February 28, 2006, (ii) March 1, 2006
to February 14, 2007, and (iii) August 9, 2007 to April 20, 2009. The samples are chosen based on
important demarcations of events. August 9th, 2007, marks the beginning of the financial crisis.
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Table 5: Regressions on Violations of Core Inequality Restrictions
The dependent variable is in columns (1)-(3) is av, which is the percentage of violations of the core restrictions per day.
The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is I(av 6= 0). a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percent of core violations Violation (Y/N)
Apr 1 2004- Mar 1 2006- Aug 9 2007- Apr 1 2004- Mar 1 2006- Aug 9 2007-
VARIABLES Feb 28 2006 Feb 14 2007 Apr 20 2009 Feb 28 2006 Feb 14 2007 Apr 20 2009
Lagged violations 0.0295b 0.0868a 0.0382a
(0.0119) (0.0120) (0.00374)
1 month CDOR minus OIS -16.37a 0.798 -0.584a -6.247b -2.170 0.281
(1.826) (2.227) (0.182) (2.477) (3.301) (0.485)
Number of lenders 0.454a 0.190a 0.315a 0.357a 0.373a 0.344a
(0.0466) (0.0589) (0.0230) (0.0807) (0.0930) (0.0732)
Number of borrowers 0.470a 0.0534 0.200a 0.337a 0.180b 0.164b
(0.0491) (0.0556) (0.0253) (0.0806) (0.0886) (0.0746)
Number of trades -0.267a 0.0302 -0.128a 0.0338 0.0264 0.0588
(0.0400) (0.0377) (0.0169) (0.0631) (0.0669) (0.0532)
Actual LVTS settlements 0.0773c 0.0294 0.0393a 0.170 0.00613 0.0547b
(100 millions) (0.0439) (0.0312) (0.00690) (0.122) (0.0721) (0.0272)
Constant -1.027a -1.565a -0.191 -3.015a -2.346a -2.497a
(0.174) (0.373) (0.139) (0.313) (0.526) (0.379)
Observations 463 231 397 469 240 416
April 20, 2009 is the day before the Bank of Canada operated an interest rate policy at the effective
lower bound, making analysis after this day more complicated. March 1, 2006 to February 14,
2007 is when the Bank of Canada committed to reducing settlement balances to zero and not fully
neutralizing it’s Sale and Repurchase Agreement operations in order to order reinforce the target
rate (Reid (2007)). April 1, 2004 is the first day that our data exists.
The explanatory variables used to explain violations of the core restrictions (equations (2) and
(3)) are at the market level. We include CDOR−OIS, as well as the number of borrowers, lenders,
and trades. We also include actual cash settlements in the system. The results are presented in Table
5. The percentage of violations we observe in the data are decreasing in the CDOR − OIS spread
and increasing the number of participants. These findings are reasonable as the first suggests that
multilateral bargaining becomes more focused as market risk increases and therefore it is more likely
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that the bargaining mechanism results in an efficient outcome. The opposite is true when there are
a large number of participants. The more players involved in the game, the greater the percentage of
violations, which suggests there is more likely to be an inefficient outcome when a larger group tries
to negotiate than when there is a smaller group. Finally, we find that an increase in cash balances
by the central bank is correlated with an increase in core violations. Liquidity injections, therefore,
appear to increase the probability of inefficiency as well as the number of inefficient allocations.
Consistent with Goodfriend and King (1988), the financial market is efficient at allocating credit
without the central bank holding large cash balances.
4.2.2 Bargaining Regressions
For bargaining power we estimate a linear time-series regression with a long list of explanatory
variables: we include a lagged dependent variable because bargaining power is relatively persistent,
as well as the number of lenders, number of borrowers, total number of transactions, actual LVTS
settlements in the system, one month CDOR − OIS spread, cash allocations from the Bank of
Canada liquidity facility (term PRA), IMPP allocations, distance-to-default, CDS spreads, liquidity
to assets at month t− 1, wholesale funding to assets at month m− 1, and borrower fixed effects.
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Table 6: Bargaining Regressions – Full Sample
The sample is from April 1, 2004 to April 20, 2009. The dependent variable is 100∗(1−λ),
i.e. the bargaining power of the borrowers. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a
p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
(1-λ)t−1 0.411a 0.513a 0.378a 0.375a
(0.0415) (0.0430) (0.0428) (0.0431)
Percent of core violations 0.159a 0.193a 0.180a 0.188a
(0.0614) (0.0638) (0.0635) (0.0635)
Number of lenders -0.0860 -0.107 0.115 0.0832
(0.148) (0.154) (0.146) (0.146)
Number of borrowers -0.306 -0.202 -0.118 -0.384
(0.485) (0.510) (0.577) (0.580)
Number of trades -0.202b -0.200b -0.233b -0.203b
(0.0927) (0.0994) (0.0989) (0.0983)
Actual LVTS settlements (100 millions) 0.00549 -0.0254 -0.0183 -0.0195
(0.0828) (0.0875) (0.0819) (0.0838)
1 month CDOR minus OIS -6.139a -1.573 -5.573a -5.320a
(1.438) (1.322) (1.431) (1.450)
I(Term PRA allocation at t-1>0) 0.897 2.126a 0.408 0.210
(0.652) (0.721) (0.673) (0.631)
I(IMPP allocation at t-1>0) 0.00662 1.376 -0.617 -0.979
(2.200) (2.139) (2.046) (2.079)
Distance to default -0.846a -0.406
(0.119) (0.258)
Liquidity/assets at m-1 1.425 -5.169c 0.878 2.490
(3.172) (3.070) (4.720) (4.854)
Loan amount/borrower’s LVTS collateral -31.69 -69.44b 1.438 5.159
(26.63) (27.68) (32.50) (33.37)
Wholesale funding/assets at m-1 -5.086 -31.45a -8.525 -2.205
(8.992) (8.718) (11.20) (11.41)
CDS 0.0516a 0.0288c
(0.00647) (0.0172)
Constant 37.43a 30.89a 29.01a 31.48a
(3.141) (3.326) (3.089) (3.505)
Observations 1208 1208 862 862
R2 0.498 0.464 0.589 0.603
Borrower FE X X X X
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We present two tables of results. We report the full sample results in Table 6 and sub-sample
results in Table 5. Table 6 column (4) includes the full set of variables but because some of the
risk variables are highly collinear in columns (1)-(3) we present slight deviations, dropping one or
more of these risk factors. Overall, we find that the bargaining power of the borrower is persistent,
increasing in the number of core violations, and decreasing in the number of trades. The negative
coefficient on the CDOR−OIS spread suggests that bargaining power is decreasing in market risk.
There are negative correlations between distance-to-default and bargaining power and wholesale
funding and bargaining power. At the bank-level, therefore, an increase in risk is correlated with
less bargaining power. However, we find a positive correlation between CDS spreads and bargaining
power, suggesting the opposite effect of the other risk factors - that an increase in risk is correlated
with an increase in bargaining power.
Table 5 decomposes the full sample results into the same 3 sub-samples as in the Poisson and
probit regressions presented above. Presenting the data in this manner illustrates a striking change
in behavior in the interbank market during the financial crisis. In the “normal” periods 2004-2006
and 2006-2007, the coefficients attached to the risk measures suggest that riskier institutions enjoy
less bargaining power. However, during the financial crisis period (post-2007), bargaining power
becomes negatively correlated with distance-to-default and positively correlated with CDS spreads
and wholesale funding exposure. Thus riskier institutions enjoyed more bargaining power during
these troubled times.
What are possible explanations? One possibility is that mark-to-market accounting and bank
interconnectedness means that some banks were concerned with their positions vis-a´-vis the riskier
banks (e.g. Bond and Leitner (2010)). The short-term cost of lending to a risky bank at a discount
to an interconnected bank might be far less than the cost of having to mark down assets linked
to a failed institution. Another reason is that market participants may simply want to prevent
government intervention. The cost of government intervention might be deemed too high for many
participants, given the future regulatory burden that would come with the failure of a Canadian
financial institution would likely be high.
The possibility that financial institutions were lending to riskier institutions out of self-interest
can be analyzed by looking at transition probabilities from being a lender one day and a borrower the
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next. Table 8 presents summary statistics of transition probabilities for both borrowers transitioning
to lenders (Pr(X ′ > 0|X < 0)) and lenders transitioning to borrowers (Pr(X ′ < 0|X > 0)). The
top panel presents transitions using the full set of data while panels 2-4 present information on sub-
periods. The median probability in the first case is approximately 68% where the median probability
in the latter case is approximately 45%. This indicates that the incidence that a particular institution
is a “lender” or “borrower” is not persistent, and suggests that lenders may, in fact, be willing to
support or subsidize troubled borrowers out of concern that they might find themselves in a similar
situation in the future.13
The summary statistics from the sub-periods suggests there is not a great deal of change in
persistence over time, except for the probability of transitioning from lender to borrower it smaller
at the lower quantile in period 3. Overall the lack of any significant change in the transition
probabilities suggests that bargaining power increased for borrowers in general, and not for any
particular set of borrowers. A careful look at the bank-level transition probabilities, not presented
here, does not reveal overwhelming evidence to suggest any particular borrower received preferential
treatment.
Table 8: Transition Probabilities
Minimum 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Maximum
Full Sample
Pr(X ′ > 0|X < 0) 0.37 0.56 0.68 0.69 0.86 0.96
Pr(X ′ < 0|X > 0) 0.00 0.20 0.45 0.40 0.60 0.77
Period 1: April 1, 2004 - Feb 28, 2006
Pr(X ′ > 0|X < 0) 0.33 0.50 0.70 0.69 0.87 1.0
Pr(X ′ < 0|X > 0) 0.00 0.22 0.39 0.40 0.66 0.72
Period 2: March 1, 2006 - Feb 14, 2007
Pr(X ′ > 0|X < 0) 0.31 0.54 0.64 0.68 0.87 0.95
Pr(X ′ < 0|X > 0) 0.00 0.17 0.45 0.40 0.63 0.82
Period 3: August 9, 2007 - April 20, 2009
Pr(X ′ > 0|X < 0) 0.28 0.50 0.63 0.66 0.87 1.0
Pr(X ′ < 0|X > 0) 0.00 0.06 0.41 0.37 0.65 0.73
Notes: Pr(X′ > 0|X < 0) denotes the probability an FI is a lender today conditional on that FI being a borrower
the last time they were in the overnight market. Pr(X′ < 0|X > 0) denotes the probability of an FI being a
borrower today conditional on that FI being a lender the last time they were in the overnight market.
13 Such reciprocal relationships among financial institutions has been documented elsewhere by Ashcraft and Duffie
(2007) as well as in the popular press, cf, the importance placed on relationships among U.S. investment banks during
the collapse of LTCM in 1998 and the more recent financial crisis.
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5 Economic Significance of Results
Given the results from the regressions above, especially the evidence supporting a (weak) “too big to
fail” story, we next quantify the size of these effects. First, consider a two-standard deviation decrease
in a bank’s distance-to-default, which implies an increase in this bank’s riskiness as a borrower. If
we use the estimated coefficient in column (6) of Table (1.951) – for the pre-crisis period – this leads
to an 8.86% decrease in bargaining power. By construction, there is a linear relationship between
the bargaining power measure λ and the interest rate y; specifically, a movement from λ = 0 to
λ = 1 corresponds to the 50 basis point movement from the bank rate b to the deposit rate d.
Hence, each percentage point decrease in bargaining power for the borrower corresponds to a half
basis point increase in the implied interest rate. Therefore, the 8.86% decrease in bargaining power
here corresponds to a 4.4 basis point increase in the interest rate faced by the borrowers.
In contrast, during the crisis period, we find that the same decrease in distance-to-default leads
to a increase in bargaining power of 9.78% (using the point estimate 2.155) – this was the TBTF
results that we highlighted earlier. This corresponds to a 4.9 basis point decrease in the interest
rate faced by borrowers. Evaluated at the average overnight loan size of $190 million, this implies
that lending banks reduced interest payments for risky borrowers during the crisis period by an
amount of $259 (=(0.00049/360)*$190 mill). This is roughly equal to 2.4% of the average cost of an
overnight loan (assuming an average overnight rate of 2%, which is the Bank of Canada target).
Similarly, calculations can be done with the other risk measures used in the bargaining regres-
sions. Using the wholesale funding variable, we find that, during the crisis period, a two-standard
deviation increase in this variable would lead to a 7.32% increase in bargaining power, corresponding
to a 3.66% decrease in interest rate. This implies that, on average, lenders “cut the slack” for risky
borrowers by an amount of $187.40 during the crisis.
To highlight the magnitudes of these effects, we perform counterfactual exercise in which we use
the second-period (pre-crisis) regression coefficients, coupled with the observed loans in the third
period, to predict what bargaining power would have been in the third period, in the absence of
the TBTF results in the third period regressions. These counterfactual bargaining power measures
are presented in Figure 10. The top line in this graph presents the counterfactual values of λ.
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Figure 10: Actual versus counterfactual bargaining power for crisis-period loans
Top line: counterfactual bargaining weights (λ) using second-period regression coeffi-
cients; Middle line: counterfactual bargaining weights (λ) using first-period regression coeffi-
cients; Bottom line: actual bargaining weights (λ) using third-period regression coefficients.
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Figure 11: Costs of TBTF
This is a graph of the difference in the second-period counterfactual bargaining power
and the actual bargaining power multiplied by the average loan size on each day and the
one-day interest cost, i.e. 50bps/360.
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Obviously, this line trends upward over time, reaching the upper bound of 1 near the end of the
sample, indicating that, in the absence of the TBTF effects, bargaining power would have shifted
almost entirely to lenders between August 2007 and February 2009.
For comparison, the actual bargaining weights for the crisis-period loans, computed using the
third-period regression coefficients, are also presented in the graph. The divergence between the
actual and counterfactual results is remarkable: the actual bargaining weights steadily become more
favorable to the borrowers, as the crisis proceeds.
To put this in monetary terms, we plot, in Figure 11, the “costs” of the TBTF effects, in terms of
the difference in interest payments which borrowers would have had to pay if their bargaining power
followed the counterfactual path during the crisis, as compared to the actual path. Corresponding
to the results in Figure 10, we find that these costs increase steadily over crisis period. A cost of
$10,000 represents 90% the average cost of an overnight loan at a target rate of 2%. Measured this
way, the effect of TBTF on bargaining are substantial.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we examine efficiency and bargaining power in the Canadian interbank loan market.
This market, however, is complicated. The players are engaged in an imperfect competition game
in which their actions are restricted by trading conventions making it difficult to characterize the
equilibrium of such a game, which is a prerequisite to any analysis of bargaining and efficiency.
Instead of modeling the multilateral trading environment in detail, we instead impose a very general
and classical equilibrium concept: that of the core. This simply imposes a type of ex-post no-arbitrage
condition on the observed outcomes.
We study efficiency and bargaining power of financial institutions in the Large Value Transfer
System (LVTS) in Canada. Our results indicate that while the interbank market in Canada is fairly
efficient, there is a systemic inefficiency that is persistent through our sample. Importantly, the
efficiency of the system deteriorates with the liquidity interventions of the central bank. This result
is in line with the views put forth by Goodfriend and King (1988) on the efficiency of the interbank
market.
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While we find that bargaining power is about equal between lenders and borrowers throughout
the sample, during the financial crisis there was a shift in bargaining power favoring borrowers. Re-
gressions confirm that as counterparty risk increased during the financial crisis, the riskier borrower
banks were able to obtain better rates. There are a number of possible explanations, however, our
findings are most consistent with a “weak” version of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) hypothesis whereby
banks within the Canadian overnight market continued to lend to risky counterparties despite the
increasing risk in the market. The main hypothesis put forth is that banks are tightly interconnected,
which we confirm using borrower-to-lender transition probabilities. A more speculative view is that
financial institutions acted to conserve the existing market structure rather than risk the possibility
of one institution defaulting and the survivor’s facing more stringent regulation.
In ongoing work, we plan to explore the extent to which the repeated and dynamic interactions
among the banks underly this result.
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